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Abstract—We consider a cloud-based control architecture for
a linear plant with Gaussian process noise, where the state of the
plant contains a client’s sensitive information. We assume that
the cloud tries to estimate the state while executing a designated
control algorithm. The mutual information between the client’s
actual state and the cloud’s estimate is adopted as a measure of
privacy loss. We discuss the necessity of uplink and downlink
privacy masks. After observing that privacy is not necessarily
a monotone function of the noise levels of privacy masks, we
discuss the joint design procedure for uplink and downlink
privacy masks. Finally, the trade-off between privacy and control
performance is explored.
Index Terms—cloud-based control, mutual information,
privacy-utility trade-off
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud-based control is a popular platform in industrial
automation in recent years. It has a number of advantages
over conventional on-site controllers in terms of installation
costs, flexibility, and computational resources. In a cloud-
based control architecture, it is necessary for clients to share
operational data of a local plant with the cloud in real time.
Since operational data can contain clients’ sensitive informa-
tion, privacy concerns are inherent in cloud-based control.
Privacy has been studied in recent years in a broad range
of academic disciplines including control, information theory,
and computer science. Formal concepts of privacy include k-
anonymity, t-closeness, and `-diversity. The recent concept of
differential privacy [1] has been used in both the research
community and industry. Information-theoretic privacy [2], [3]
has also been investigated. Some of these privacy notions have
already been applied to control-related problems. Differential
privacy, in particular, has been applied to various estimation
and control problems [4]–[11]. Information-theoretic privacy
was also proposed in [12], where a rate-distortion approach
similar to [2] was generalized to feedback control systems.
While these results demonstrate the effectiveness of existing
privacy notions in feedback control systems, it is important to
be mindful that there are key differences between privacy prob-
lems for static (e.g., databases) and dynamic (e.g., feedback
control) applications. The key feature of cloud-based control
architectures, which distinguishes them from static databases,
is the existence of a bidirectional information flow between the
cloud and the client. The purpose of this paper is to identify
and address the privacy consequences of this fact, which has
received comparatively little attention in the existing privacy
literature for feedback control systems.
In this paper, we consider a cloud-based control architecture
equipped with an uplink privacy mask (perturbing the client-
to-cloud information flow) and a downlink privacy mask
(perturbing the cloud-to-client information flow). Following
[2], we adopt mutual information as a measure of privacy
loss. Our problem setup is minimal, yet effective to draw the
following conclusions:
(A) Both an uplink privacy mask and a downlink privacy
mask are necessary to enhance privacy, especially when
the process noise of the plant is absent or small. Intu-
itively, this is because the absence of a downlink privacy
mask allows the cloud to estimate the client’s state solely
based on control commands it sends. In this way, the
cloud can compromise the client’s privacy, even without
ever receiving any information from the client.
(B) Unlike applications in which only the uplink information
flow exists, privacy is not necessarily a monotone func-
tion of the noise level of the uplink privacy mask. This
fact can be understood by invoking the computation of the
capacity of channels with feedback. Consequently, a joint
design of uplink and downlink privacy masks is needed,
which is demonstrated in this paper.
Notation: Random variables are denoted by upper-case sym-
bols. The notation Xt = (X0, X1, ..., Xt) is used to denote a
sequence. If XT and Y T are random processes, the (forward)
directed information [13] is defined as
I(XT → Y T ) ,
∑T
t=0
I(Xt;Yt | Y t−1). (1)
The (backward) directed information is denoted by
I(XT ← Y T ) , I(0 ∗XT−1 → Y T ), (2)
where 0 ∗ XT−1 = (0, X0, X1, ..., XT−1). The natural loga-
rithm is used throughout the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider the cloud-based control archi-
tecture shown in Fig. 1. We assume there are two parties in
this configuration, namely the cloud operator and the client.
The client owns a local plant, whose dynamics is described by
a linear dynamical system with Gaussian process noise. The
system parameters a and w are assumed to be known to both
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Fig. 1. Cloud-based control architecture considered in this paper.
parties. We consider the situation in which the local plant is
controlled by the cloud, but, in the interest of privacy, the client
does not wish a full disclosure of the state of the plant, Xt. We
assume that the client adopts a bidirectional privacy masking
mechanism comprised of uplink and downlink privacy masks,
as shown in Fig. 1. Both uplink and downlink privacy masks
are simple additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels,
where noise intensities m and n are parameters to be designed.
The cloud observes a perturbed version Yt = Xt +Nt of the
state, which is multiplied by a feedback control gain k 6= 0 to
compute the raw control input Ut = kYt. Instead of applying
the raw control input Ut, the client applies a perturbed version
of the control input, Vt = Ut+Mt, where the realization of the
random variable Mt is not known to the cloud. For simplicity,
we assume that all random variables are scalar-valued. We
also assume that k is a pre-designed feedback gain, which is
treated as a constant in this paper.
To analyze the fundamental limitations of the cloud’s capa-
bility to estimate Xt, we assume that the parameters m and n
are available to the cloud, based on which the estimate Xˆt is
computed by Kalman filtering. Due to the invertibility of the
Kalman filter, the following identities are easy to verify:
I(XT → XˆT ) = I(XT → Y T ) = I(XT → UT ) (3)
I(XT ← XˆT ) = I(XT ← Y T ) = I(XT ← UT ). (4)
Following [2], this paper adopts the mutual information
I(XT ; XˆT ) as a privacy metric. The following identity, known
as the conservation of information [14], is useful in the
developments below:
I(XT ; XˆT ) = I(XT → XˆT ) + I(XT ← XˆT ). (5)
This identity articulates the fact that it is not only the uplink
information flow, but also the downlink information flow that
impact the confidentiality of cloud-based control systems.
Minimizing mutual information should therefore account for
information flow in both directions.
Fig. 2. Mutual Information for different values of m and n and for a = 1,
k = −1, and w = 0.05.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Computation of performance metrics
To analyze performance from both information and control
perspectives, we explicitly compute the following metrics:
I∞(X → Xˆ) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
I(XT → XˆT ) (6)
I∞(X ← Xˆ) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
I(XT ← XˆT ) (7)
I∞(X; Xˆ) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
I(XT ; XˆT ) (8)
C∞(X,U) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
E[qX2t + rU2t ]. (9)
In what follows, we regard I∞(X; Xˆ) as the privacy loss
and C∞(X,U) as the control cost. In general, it is desirable
to keep both of these quantities small. We next derive exact
expressions for them in terms of system parameters.
Lemma 1: The mutual information and the H2 control
performance are
I∞(X; Xˆ) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Σ
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I∞(X→Xˆ)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
k2n
m+ w
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I∞(X←Xˆ)
(10)
C∞(X,U) =
(q + rk2)(m+ k2n+ w)
1− (a+ k)2 + rk
2n, (11)
where Σ is the positive solution to the algebraic Riccati
equation (ARE)(
a2n
Σ + n
− 1
)
Σ +m+ w = 0. (12)
Fig. 2 shows the values of mutual information I∞(X; Xˆ)
as a function of m and n. We note that it is neither convex
nor concave in (m,n).
B. Necessity of privacy masks
The necessity of privacy masks can be understood by
analyzing I∞(X; Xˆ).
Proposition 1: For arbitrary w ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0 such that
w +m > 0, we have limn↘0 I∞(X; Xˆ) = +∞.
This result shows that the lack of uplink privacy mask (cloud
observes unperturbed data) implies unbounded privacy loss,
indicating its necessity for privacy protection.
Proposition 2: If w = 0, for arbitrary n ≥ 0, we have
limm↘0 I∞(X; Xˆ) = +∞.
This result indicates that the downlink privacy mask is
also necessary when w = 0. To see why, notice that when
w = 0, the lack of downlink privacy mask (m = 0) makes
the plant a deterministic dynamical system from the cloud’s
perspective. Assuming that the initial state X0 is known, the
cloud operator is able to compute Xt by “simulating” the
dynamics based on the knowledge of the control sequence
U t alone. We emphasize that such a privacy attack through
the downlink channel is possible even when the client shares
no information over time.
Proposition 2 does not apply when w 6= 0. However,
even in such cases, the downlink privacy filter can provide
robustness against modeling errors. We will revisit this point
in Section III-E.
C. Connection to the capacity of channels with feedback
As Fig. 2 shows, for a fixed value of m, the privacy
loss (10) is not a monotonically decreasing function of the
noise level n of the uplink privacy filter. This is a unique
characteristic of systems with feedback, and shows a stark
contrast to the privacy theory for static databases, where larger
perturbations provide stronger privacy protections. A closer
look at (10) reveals that, for fixed values of (m,w, a, k), the
uplink directed information I(X → Xˆ) is indeed a convex
and monotonically non-increasing function of n. A related
observation has already been made in [12]. However, the
downlink directed information I∞(X ← Xˆ) is a concave
and monotonically increasing function of n. To understand
the latter fact, it is instrumental to invoke the computation of
channel capacity under noiseless feedback [15]–[18].
Fig. 3 shows an equivalent diagram to Fig. 1 when m = 0.
This diagram shows a connection between Fig. 1 and the
computation of the capacity of a channel with feedback.
It is known that the capacity of a channel with noiseless
feedback coincides with the supremum of I∞(X ← Y ) over
the distribution of inputs, subject to channel input constraints
[16]. In Fig. 1 with m = 0, the channel input distribution is
restricted to the form Yt = Xt + Nt, with Nt ∼ N (0, n).
Since the channel input power E[Y 2t ] monotonically increases
with n, the capacity also increases with n. The second term
of the equation (10) confirms this intuition.
D. Joint uplink and downlink mask designs
In this section, we find the optimal values of m and n to
have minimum privacy loss.
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 +𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
Fig. 3. When m = 0, Fig. 1 can be viewed as a communication channel
with memory with noiseless feedback.
Fig. 4. Mutual Information I∞(XT ; XˆT ) as a function of α for a = 1,
k = −1, and w = 0.05.
Proposition 3: The mutual information (10) depends only
on the Noise-to Noise (NNR) ratio α := nm+w . In particular,
I∞(X; Xˆ) =
1
2
log
 (a2 − 1 + 1α ) +
√
(a2 − 1 + 1α )2 + 4α
2

+
1
2
log
(
1 + k2α
)
. (13)
Proposition 3 indicates that the level of privacy is determined
by the ratio of n and m + w and not by the magnitude of
noises. The mutual information (13) as a function of α is
depicted in Fig. 4. This function is neither convex nor concave.
Nevertheless, we have the following result:
Proposition 4: Mutual information (13) is uniquely min-
imized by the unique positive solution α∗ to the quartic
equation
(a2 − 1)2α4 + 2(a2 + 1)α3 − 2
k2
α− 1
k4
= 0. (14)
The red line on Fig. 2 shows the line n = α∗(m+ w). As
can be inferred, I∞(X; Xˆ) is constant along this line.
E. Privacy-utility trade-off
The privacy masks also alter the control performance
C∞(X,U). To analyze the privacy-utility trade-off, we now
consider the following multi-objective optimization problem
min
m,n
I∞(X; Xˆ) + λC∞(X,U) (15)
where λ > 0 is a positive weight. We observed in Lemma 1
that the control cost is affine in m and n. Thus, using n =
α(m+w), we can express C∞ as an affine function of α, m,
and αm, which is denoted by C∞(α, αm,m) with a slight
abuse of notation. Since Proposition 3 shows that I∞(X; Xˆ) is
only a function of α (denoted by I∞(α)), (15) can be rewritten
in terms of α and m as minα,m
[
I∞(α) +λ C∞(α, αm,m)
]
.
Assuming that the closed-loop system is stable (i.e., |a+k| <
1), the affine function C∞(α, αm,m) is increasing in its
individual arguments. Hence, we can proceed as
min
α,m
[
I∞(α) + λ C∞(α, αm,m)
]
(16a)
= min
α
[
I∞(α) + λmin
m
[C∞(α, αm,m)]
]
(16b)
= min
α
[
I∞(α) + λ C∞(α, 0, 0)
]
, (16c)
where C∞(α, 0, 0) is an increasing affine function in α. This
observation indicates that (i) the privacy-utility trade-off can
be performed purely in terms of the NNR α = nm+w , and that
(ii) as far as the NNR α is chosen to be the minimizer of
(16c), selecting m = 0 (no downlink mask) is mathematically
optimal. However, (ii) must be taken with two caveats. First,
as observed in Proposition 2, simultaneous m = 0 and w =
0 result in an ill-defined α and an unbounded privacy loss.
Second, even if w > 0, the task of selecting the optimal n
such that α = nm+w minimizes (16c) becomes sensitive to
modeling error of w if m = 0. Thus, the downlink mask has
the practical benefit of enhancing robustness against modeling
errors of w.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We consider the case of a scalar-valued LTI system in finite
time horizon. The closed-loop dynamics are
Xt = aXt−1 + Ut−1 +Mt−1 +Wt (17)
Yt = Xt +Nt (18)
Ut = kYt. (19)
Xt can be estimated by Xˆt = E[Xt | Y t, U t−1] with the error
covariance Σt = E[(Xt− Xˆt)(Xt− Xˆt)ᵀ | Y t, U t−1] that can
be calculated iteratively by Kalman filtering via
Xˆt|t−1 = aXˆt−1 + Ut−1 Xˆ0 = 0 (20a)
Σt|t−1 = a2Σt−1 +m+ w Σ0 = 0 (20b)
lt = Σt|t−1/(Σt|t−1 + n) (20c)
Xˆt = Xˆt|t−1 + lt(Yt − Xˆt|t−1) (20d)
Σt = (1− lt)2Σt|t−1 + l2tn. (20e)
It follows from (20) that
Xˆt = Xˆt|t−1 + lt(Xt +Nt − Xˆt|t−1)
= (1− lt)aXˆt−1 + (1− lt)Ut−1 + ltXt + ltNt.
(21)
The uplink information flow I(XT → XˆT ) is computed as
I(XT → XˆT ) =
∑T
t=0
I(Xt; Xˆt|Xˆt−1) =∑T
t=1
[
I(Xt−1; Xˆt|Xˆt−1, Xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(A)
+ I(Xt; Xˆt|Xˆt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(B)
]
.
(22)
Considering (21) and the fact that Ut−1 = kYt−1 is a
deterministic function of Xˆt−1, we have:
(A) = I(Xt−1; Xˆt|Xˆt−1, Xt) = I(Xt−1; ltNt|Xˆt−1, Xt) = 0
since Nt is independent of Xt−1 given (Xˆt−1, Xt). We next
focus on (B), again by considering (21):
(B) = I(Xt; Xˆt|Xˆt−1)
= I(Xt; (1− lt)Ut−1 + ltXt + ltNt|Xˆt−1)
= I(Xt; ltXt + ltNt|Xˆt−1)
= h(ltXt + ltNt|Xˆt−1)− h(ltXt + ltNt|Xˆt−1, Xt)
= h(ltXt + ltNt|Xˆt−1)− 1
2
log(l2tn).
(23)
The first term in the last line can be made more explicit as
h(lt(aXt−1 + Ut−1 +Mt−1 +Wt +Nt)|Xˆt−1)
= h(lt(aXt−1 +Mt−1 +Wt +Nt)|Xˆt−1) (24a)
= h(lt(aet−1 +Mt−1 +Wt +Nt)|Xˆt−1) (24b)
=
1
2
log(l2t (a
2Σt−1 +m+ w + n)) (24c)
=
1
2
log(l2t (Σt|t−1 + n)). (24d)
In (24b), we used the fact the innovation et−1 = Xt−1−Xˆt−1
is independent of the previous measurement (and of Xˆt−1).
Therefore, the uplink directed information is:
I(XT → XˆT ) =
∑T
t=1
[1
2
log(l2t (Σt|t−1 + n))−
1
2
log(l2tn)
]
=
∑T
t=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
Σt|t−1
n
)
.
The backward directed information is computed as
I(0 ∗ XˆT−1 → XT ) = I(0;X1|X0) +
T∑
t=1
I(Xˆt−1;Xt|Xt−1)
=
∑T
t=1
[
h(Xt|Xt−1)− h(Xt|Xˆt−1, Xt−1)
]
=
∑T
t=1
[
h(kNt−1 +Mt−1 +Wt−1)− h(Mt−1 +Wt−1)
]
=
∑T
t=1
[1
2
log(k2n+m+ w)− 1
2
log(m+ w)
]
=
∑T
t=1
[1
2
log
(
1 +
k2n
m+ w
)]
.
Due to the observability of the system, the limit Σ =
limt→∞ Σt|t−1 exists for the Riccati recursion defined by
(20c) and (20e), which coincide with the unique positive
solution of ARE (12).
To compute the control cost C∞(X,U), consider the pre-
dicted error covariance Pt = E[X2t ] which can be computed
from the recursion
Pt = (a+ k)
2Pt−1 +m+ k2n+ w P0 = 0. (25)
The control cost is obtained as
C∞(X,U) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1
E[qX2t + rU2t ]
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1
E[(q + rk2)X2t + rk2N2t ]
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
[(q + rk2)Pt + rk
2n]=(q + rk2)P+ rk2n,
where P = m+k
2n+w
1−(a+k)2 is the solution to algebraic Riccati
equation induced by (25).
B. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
From (12), Σ → m + w as n → 0. Thus, Proposition 1 is
clear. When w = 0, the downlink information flow diverges
for m→ 0 unless m+ w = 0 (Proposition 2).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
For uplink directed information, by direct substitution,
I∞(X ← Xˆ) = 1
2
log
(
1 +
k2n
m+ w
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 + k2α
)
.
To compute the downlink directed information, we can plug
m+ w = nα in ARE (12). Then (12) reduces to(
Σ
n
)2
−
(
a2 − 1 + 1
α
)
Σ
n
− 1
α
= 0.
Substituting the positive solution in I∞(X → Xˆ) =
1
2 log
(
1 + Σn
)
completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Equation (12) can be solved for n as n = Σ(Σ−p)(a2−1)Σ+p , where
p := m+w is defined for simplicity. Substituting this into (10),
we have
I∞(X; Xˆ)=
1
2
log
(
a2Σ
Σ− p+
k2
p
Σ2
(a2−1)Σ+ p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F
.
Since F > 0, the minimizing Σ is obtained by solving
1
a2
∂F
∂Σ
=
−p
(Σ− p)2 +
k2
p
(a2 − 1)Σ2 + 2pΣ
((a2 − 1)Σ + p)2 = 0. (26)
Substituting (a2 − 1)Σ + p = Σ(Σ−p)n (this identity follows
from (12)) into the denominator of the second term in (26),
we obtain
1
(Σ− p)2
(
−pΣ + n
2k2
p
((a2 − 1)Σ + 2p)
)
= 0
from which Σ is solved as Σ = 2pn
2
( p
2
k2
−(a2−1)n2) . Substituting
this back into (12), a quartic equation for n is obtained as
(a2 − 1)2n4 + 2p(a2 + 1)n3 − 2p
3
k2
n− p
4
k4
= 0. (27)
We can rewrite (27) in terms of α = np as
F (α) = (a2 − 1)2α4 + 2(a2 + 1)α3− 2
k2
α− 1
k4
= 0. (28)
Note that F ′(0) < 0, limα→∞ F ′(α) = ∞, and F ′(α) is
strictly increasing. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a unique αˆ > 0 such that F ′(αˆ) = 0. Therefore,
F (α) is strictly decreasing for α ∈ [0, αˆ) and strictly increas-
ing for α ∈ (αˆ,∞). It follows from F (0) < 0 that F (αˆ) < 0.
Since limα→∞ F (α) =∞ and F (α) is strictly increasing on
(αˆ,∞), again by the intermediate value theorem, F (α) = 0
necessarily has a unique positive solution α∗.
V. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes the generalization of this paper’s
results to multi-dimensional control systems. It is also worth
investigating whether the observations (A) and (B) in Section I
hold for other privacy metrics, such as differential privacy.
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